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Abstract 
 
Recent studies of portfolio performance have separately introduced the use of portfolio 
holdings and conditioning information.  This paper combines these innovations to create 
a new performance measure.  Our conditional weight-based measure has several 
advantages.  By using conditioning information, it can avoid biases in weight-based 
measures as discussed by Grinblatt and Titman (1993).  When there is conditioning 
information, returns-based measures (even conditional measures) also face a bias if 
managers can trade between observation dates.  The new measures avoid this “interim 
trading bias”.  We use the new measure to provide fresh insights about performance in a 
sample of U.S. equity pension fund managers.  
    1   
Measuring the performance of a managed portfolio has long been of interest to financial 
economists and practitioners alike.  However, even after years of research, several issues 
remain unresolved.  Among these is how to handle the dynamic behavior of a managed 
portfolio.  Difficulties arise, not only because the required returns on the assets in a 
portfolio may be time-varying, but also because the portfolio structure may vary due to 
the manager’s strategy or other influences, such as exogenous cash flows to the fund.  
These dynamics create problems in measuring performance.   
 
Most current performance measurement techniques are returns-based, and involve 
regressing the return of a portfolio on some benchmark return.  The measure of 
performance, or alpha, is the intercept in the regression.  A strength of returns-based 
methodologies is their minimal information requirements.  One needs only returns on the 
managed portfolio and the benchmark.  However, this ignores potentially useful 
information that is often available: the composition of the managed portfolio.  Cornell 
(1979) was among the first to propose using portfolio weights to measure the 
performance of trading strategies.  Copeland and Mayers (1982) modify Cornell’s 
measure and use it to analyze Value Line rankings.  Grinblatt and Titman (1993) propose 
a weight-based measure of mutual fund performance.
1 
 
  Previous studies that use portfolio weights combine them with unconditional 
moments to measure performance.  However, Ferson and Schadt (1996) put returns-based 
measures into a conditional framework and find that it changes the results.  Therefore, it 
is interesting to consider conditioning information in weight-based measures of 
performance.
2 
 
The use of portfolio weights may be especially important in a conditional setting.  
When expected returns are time-varying and managers trade between return observation 
dates, returns-based approaches are likely to be biased.  Even conditional returns-based 
                                                           
1 A number of studies have used the Grinblatt and Titman measure.  These include Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989a), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Zheng (1996), and Wermers (1997).    2   
methods are affected.  This bias, which we call the “interim trading bias”, can be avoided 
by using portfolio weights in a conditional setting.  
 
  This paper develops a weight-based approach with conditioning information and 
evaluates the relative advantages of this approach.
3  We illustrate the approach on a 
sample of U.S. equity pension fund managers, during 1985-1994, and document that the 
growth-style pension funds tend to trade more and follow a momentum strategy, 
compared with value-style funds.  These differences in fund strategy allow us to highlight 
several interesting features of the performance measures. 
 
  We find that a conditional weight-based measure has some important advantages.  
It controls for interim trading bias in a setting where returns-based measures, including 
conditional measures, are severely biased.  The conditional weight measure controls for 
trading on public information better than either returns-based measures or weight-based 
measures that use unconditional means.  Using both portfolio weights and conditioning 
variables, we also obtain more precision than with the unconditional weight measure.   
 
In our sample of pension funds, returns-based measures suggest that the funds 
have positive abnormal returns, which is consistent with previous studies.
4  With 
conditioning information in a weight-based measure, the funds have neutral performance.  
Thus, previous estimates of abnormal pension fund performance may reflect biased 
measures. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) create characteristic-based benchmarks to measure the 
performance of mutual funds, where they condition the benchmark on the fund’s characteristics. 
3  Recent studies have made limited use of portfolio weights in a conditional setting, by regressing returns 
on lagged weights and conditioning variables to see if the weights have marginal explanatory power [e.g. 
Graham and Harvey (1996), Becker et al (1999)].  These studies are limited to market timing, and thus a 
single weight in stocks versus cash.  We study the weights on the full vector of assets in a portfolio.  Eckbo 
and Smith (1997) use a version of our measure, as developed in Khang (1997), in a study of insider trading. 
4 Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) found inferior performance among pension fund managers using 
the S&P 500 as the performance benchmark, but Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998b) show this 
can be explained by the small stock exposure of the funds in their sample over a period where small stocks 
perform poorly relative to the S&P 500.  Coggins, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993) find positive performance    3   
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows:  Section I motivates conditional weight-
based measures of performance.  Section II formulates the empirical measure and 
discusses its estimation.  In Section III, we discuss the data.  Section IV presents the 
empirical results, Section V explores their robustness, and Section VI concludes the 
paper. 
 
I.  The Measures 
 
  The intuition behind weight-based performance measures is rather simple.   
Suppose a manager has private information telling him when returns are likely to be 
higher or lower than expected by the market.  Other things equal, the manager can profit 
by shifting his portfolio weights toward those assets whose returns are likely to be higher 
than expected and away from those assets whose returns are likely to be lower.  This 
suggests that the covariance between the change in a portfolio’s weights and subsequent 
abnormal security returns may be used to measure performance.  Here, we define a 
security’s abnormal return as the component of return not expected by the market.   
 
  This paper develops the Conditional Weight Measure (CWM).  The measure is 
the conditional covariance between future returns and portfolio weight changes, summed 
across the asset holdings.  The measure can be motivated, following Grinblatt and Titman 
(1993), with a single-period model where an investor maximizes the expected utility of 
terminal wealth.
5 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
among 72 equity porfolios with an unconditional returns-based approach.  Christopherson, Ferson, and 
Glassman (1998a) find evidence of persistent performance using a conditional returns-based approach.   
5 Grinblatt and Titman (1993) point out that the covariance between the weights and subsequent abnormal 
returns need not be positive for every security in a portfolio managed with private information.  Consider 
two securities that are correlated with each other.  This manager may choose to buy one and sell the other as 
a result of hedging considerations.  Grinblatt and Titman (1989b) demonstrate, however, that the sum of the 
covariances across securities will be positive for an investor with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, as 
defined by Rubinstein (1973).    4   
A. The Conditional Weight Measure 
 
  Consider the following utility maximization problem, 
 
   { } S Z W r W U E f , | )
~
’ ) 1 ( ( max 0 0 R w w + + ,             (1) 
           
where rf is the riskfree rate; ~ R is the vector of risky asset returns in excess of the riskfree 
rate; W0 is the initial wealth; w is the vector of portfolio weights on the risky assets; Z is 
public information available at time 0; and S is private information available at time 0.  
Private information, by definition, is correlated with ~ R, conditional on Z.  If we assume 
that returns are conditionally normal and consider an investor with nonincreasing absolute 
risk aversion, it follows from the optimization problem [see Khang (1997)] that 
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)’ , ( > − Z Z E S Z E R R w ,               (2) 
 
where  w(Z,S) is the optimal weight vector and  { } Z E |
~ ~
R R−  are the unexpected, or 
abnormal returns, from the perspective of an observer with the public information.  Since 
one of the variables has mean zero, equation (2) is also a conditional covariance.  It says 
that, conditional on the public information, the sum of the conditional covariances 
between the weights of a manager with private information, S, and the abnormal returns 
for the securities in a portfolio is positive.
6  If the manager has no private information, S, 
then the covariance is zero.  
 
  To develop the empirical conditional weight measure, we introduce a 
“benchmark” weight, wb, that is in the public information set Z, so equation (2) implies  
 
                                                           
6 Since this result uses conditional normality of the returns, given (Z,S), the risk of the asset returns depends 
on the precision of the signals but not on the realization of the signals.  When there is private information, 
S, the product of the weight and the unexpected return will be nonnormal, conditional on Z, and the 
conditional covariance will depend on Z in general.    5   
    () ( ) () {} 0 | |
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if the manager has superior information, S.  Because wb is a constant given Z, it will not 
affect the conditional covariance.  By making wb a function of the weights of the portfolio 
in a past time period, as discussed below, we use weight changes in the empirical CWM.  
Weight changes are advantageous on statistical grounds, as the levels of the weights may 
be nonstationary.
7  
 
B. Interpreting the Conditional Measures 
 
  Conditional performance evaluation is usually motivated by the assumption of 
market efficiency with respect to the public information Z (e.g. semi-strong form 
efficiency as defined by Fama (1970)).  However, in practice some investors may not 
monitor all public information.  We argue that even an investor who does not monitor the 
public information should be interested in a conditional performance measure, because it 
reveals the source of the manager’s performance. 
 
  Consider the relation between unconditional and conditional weight-based 
measures, 
 
           () ( ) {} ( ) ( ) () ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =
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7 Consider an example where a manager follows a buy-and-hold strategy starting with an initial set of 
weights wj0, where j=1,...,N.  At time t, the weight for security j would satisfy 
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where  ∑ − ≡
j
j p r w r j τ τ τ 1 .  If the log excess returns follow a martingale difference sequence, the weights 
wjt follow a nonstationary, I(1) process.  Differenced weights, however, are stationary.    6   
where ∆wj  ≡ wjt - wbjt.  The left-hand side is the unconditional weight measure (UWM), 
similar to Grinblatt and Titman (1993).  The second term is the “average” conditional 
weight measure, equal to the unconditional mean of equation (3).  The third term captures 
the effects of “mechanical” trading, based on the public information, Z.  By comparing 
the conditional and unconditional measures, the third term may be calculated as a 
residual.  This decomposition is useful for understanding the source of a portfolio's 
performance. 
 
  Consider an example of a manager with a two asset portfolio, one risky and one 
riskless, and a single-period investment horizon.  Suppose the manager gets a signal that 
the return on the risky asset for next period is expected to be higher than average (the 
asset’s unconditional mean).  In response,  the manager raises the weight on the risky 
asset in his portfolio, resulting in a positive unconditional weight measure in equation (4).  
The interpretation of this measured performance depends on whether or not we maintain 
the assumption of semi-strong form market efficiency. 
 
  If markets are efficient, an investor cannot use publicly available information to 
generate abnormal returns.  If the manager has only public information, the CWM is zero 
and a positive UWM comes from the right-hand term in (4).  If the manager has private 
information, a positive UWM may indicate the use of either public or private information.  
A nonzero CWM indicates the manager is using more than the public information. 
 
  Comparing the conditional and unconditional measures, an investor can 
decompose the manager’s return from active trading into a component attributable to 
private information and a component attributable to the public information.  These are the 
first and second terms on the right-hand side of (4).  If the investor does not monitor the 
public information, the second component can help to evaluate the result of the decision 
to delegate the monitoring of public information to the manager.  Its magnitude may be 
compared with the investor’s cost of monitoring public information.  The first component 
is the performance the investor could not obtain without the manager, even if he chose to    7   
monitor the public information.  Isolating this component enables an investor to 
compensate a manager for his use of private information. 
 
  If markets are not semi-strong efficient, then a public information signal 
indicating a higher expected return to the risky asset may not be associated with a rise in 
the required return.  The higher expected return may be due to pricing biases or some 
other market inefficiency.  Thus, raising the weight can increase the total return on the 
portfolio without changing the return the market requires to invest in the portfolio of 
assets.  A conditional performance measure would still be of interest to investors 
concerned with the source of the abnormal returns.  By comparing the conditional and the 
unconditional measures, an investor could infer whether the manager’s performance came 
from taking advantage of market inefficiencies discernible from the public information, 
or if it employed private information. 
 
C. Advantages of the Conditional Weight Measure 
 
  Relative to previous approaches, the CWM has a number of advantages.  Grinblatt 
and Titman (1993) note four cases where an unconditional weight-based measure may 
indicate superior performance when none exists.  The first is where the investor targets 
stocks whose expected return and risk have risen temporarily (e.g. stocks subject to 
takeover or bankruptcy).  The second is where the investor exploits serial correlation in 
stock returns.  The third is where the investor exploits the January Effect, and the fourth 
is the case of a manager who gradually changes the risk of his portfolio over time.   
 
  These problems may all be addressed using a conditional approach because they 
all involve strategies based on publicly available information.  In this paper, we include 
variables to adjust for serial correlation and the January Effect.  Of course, there are other 
conditioning variables that may be important to include in a conditional performance 
measure.  Thus, we use other publicly available predictor variables as well.
8   
                                                           
8 The sample used here does not include any funds that specialize in takeover or bankruptcy stocks.    8   
 
  The conditional weight-based approach can control a potentially important bias 
inherent in returns-based measures.  This bias, which we call the “interim trading bias”, 
arises when we depart from the assumption that returns are independently and identically 
distributed over time (iid), and is therefore especially relevant to a conditional setting.  
The problem arises when managers may trade between the dates over which returns are 
measured. 
 
Consider an example where returns are measured over two “periods,” but a 
manager trades each period.  The manager has neutral performance, but the portfolio 
weights for the second period can be a function of public information at the intervening 
date.  If returns are iid, this creates no bias, as there is no information at the intervening 
date that is correlated with the second period return.  However, if expected returns vary 
with public information, then a manager who observes and trades on public information 
at the intervening date generates a return for the second period from the conditional 
distribution.  His two-period portfolio strategy will contain more than the public 
information at the beginning of the first period, and a returns-based measure over the two 
periods will detect this as “superior” information.  Even a conditional returns-based 
measure will suffer from this interim trading bias, if it can only condition on information 
at the beginning of the first period.
9  We illustrate the interim trading bias empirically in 
section IV, and show that the bias can be substantial. 
 
  In this example, a conditional weight-based measure examines the conditional 
covariance between the manager’s weights at the beginning of the first period and the 
subsequent two-period returns.  If the manager has no information beyond the public 
information at the beginning of the first period, this conditional covariance would be 
zero.  The ability of the manager to trade at the intervening period thus creates no interim 
trading bias in a conditional weight-based measure.  
    9   
  Managers may engage in interim trading based on superior information to enhance 
performance.  A weight-based measure will not record these interim trading effects.   
Interim trading thus presents a bias under the null hypothesis that managers possess only 
public information.  Under the alternative hypothesis of superior ability, a weight-based 
measure should sacrifice some power to detect the ability.  Thus, the cost of using a 
weight-based measure to avoid bias is a potential loss of power.  However, compared 
with returns-based measures, the use of the portfolio weight data may result in improved 
power.  The tradeoff becomes an empirical question.  We find that the CWM is no less 
precise than returns-based measures, even those with conditioning information.  At the 
same time, the CWM is less susceptible to biases from interim trading on public 
information.  Thus, the empirical tradeoff favors the CWM over the other measures. 
 
II. Implementing the CWM 
 
  This section describes how we make the measures operational.  It first motivates 
the assumptions and the choice of the benchmark weights.  Then, it describes our 
econometric methods. 
 
A. An Empirical Conditional Weight Measure  
 
  The conditional weight measure at time t is 
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τ  is the benchmark weight of asset j at time t, based on a  
lag of k periods, k being the number of periods until the weights become public 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ivkovic (2000) devise a partial solution for interim trading bias in returns-based 
measures, in which they simulate the multiperiod return generated by interim-trading options.    10   
information.  The benchmark return for the manager is formed from the actual lagged 
weights of the fund at t-k, updated using a buy and hold strategy, where rpτ is a buy-and-
hold portfolio return, starting with the weights { } k jt w − , j=1,…N, at time t-k.  The 
performance benchmark is internalized, based on the manager's previous holdings.
10   
 
With the buy-and-hold benchmark, we are measuring the deviations between a 
manager's weights and a strategy of no trading during the previous k periods.  It seems 
intuitive that a manager with no information might follow a buy-and-hold strategy.  The 
benchmark weight  bjtk w  can also be motivated as a proxy for E(wjt|Zt), assuming the 
manager with only public information follows a buy-and-hold strategy.  Since equation 
(5) is a conditional covariance, this is a natural interpretation.  However, it is not essential 
that  bjtk w  be a good proxy for E(wjt|Zt).  We use different values of k because of the 
uncertainty as to when we may consider the lagged weights to be public information.  We 
discuss this more fully in the data section. 
 
B. An Unconditional Weight Measure  
 
  For comparison purposes, we compute an unconditional weight-based measure, 
  
 UWM  =  () ( ) () 





− − ∑
=
+
N
j
j jt bjtk jt r E r w w E
1
1
~ ~ .           (6)   
 
This differs from Grinblatt and Titman’s (1993) version of the measure in two ways.  
First, we use a buy-and-hold strategy to measure the weight change rather than the lagged 
weight itself.
11  Second, we use the demeaned returns, where E(rj) is the mean.  Note that 
if   [ ] 0 ~ ≠ − bjtk jt w w E , then  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 1 1
~ , ~ ~ ~
+ + − ≠ − jt bjtk jt jt bjtk jt r w w Cov r w w E .  Demeaning the 
                                                           
10 Of course, if an external benchmark is desired one need only substitute those benchmark weights for 
bjtk w . 
11 Grinblatt and Titman (1993) used the lagged weight, which implicitly assumes a rebalancing strategy.  
They indicate that they also investigated the effects of using a buy-and-hold strategy during the quarter.    11   
returns allows for nonzero mean changes in the weights, as 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 1 1
~ , ~ ~ ~
+ + − = − − jt bjtk jt j jt bjtk jt r w w Cov r E r w w E  even when  [ ] 0 ~ ≠ − bjtk jt w w E .  An 
analogous situation arises with the CWM.  In that case, we demean the returns using the 
conditional mean. 
 
C. Estimating the Measures 
 
For the CWM, we estimate the conditional expected returns of the individual 
assets as  
 
     [ ] t j t jt Z r E Z b ’ | ~
1 = + ,                (7) 
 
where  Zt  is an L vector of information variables, including a constant.  We assume that a 
linear regression delivers the conditional expectation, following most of the literature on 
conditional performance evaluation.  (We consider alternative models for the expected 
returns later, as a robustness check.) 
 
  Next, we assume that the conditional covariance between the weight changes and 
abnormal returns is approximated by a linear function of the conditioning information.  
This assumption follows Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) and can be 
motivated by a Taylor series approximation.
12  This gives us  
 
    C W M t = CWM +  t z ’ γ ,             (8) 
 
                                                           
12 Our linearity assumptions follow much of the conditional asset pricing literature.  Like most of this 
literature we ignore “model error” that may arise if linearity is a poor approximation.  Accounting for this 
source of error remains a challenge for future research.  In the empirical analysis, we consider the 
introduction of nonlinear terms.  We include the squares of the elements of Zt in regressions like (10), and 
test for their exclusion with F tests.  We find no evidence to support a nonlinear specification.    12   
where ) (Z Z z E t t − = , excluding the constant.  In equation (8) CWM is the “average 
conditional covariance,” E(CWMt).  This provides an estimate of the second term of the 
decomposition of equation (4).  
 
We set up a GMM system to carry out the estimation.   
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The parameters of the model are b, γ, CWM, UWM, and  () r E ~ , where b is the stacked 
bj’s and  () r E ~  is the stacked  ( ) j r E ~ ’s.  We form the set of moment conditions as  
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where 
c
t 1 + e  is an N vector of error terms for the N asset equations in (9) and   
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.   The GMM estimates 
are obtained by minimizing the quadratic form,  Wg g’ .  Hansen (1982) shows that the    13   
parameter estimates will be T-consistent and asymptotically normally distributed for any 
fixed positive-definite W.   
 
  The GMM system is exactly identified with (N+1)(L+1) parameters and 
(N+1)(L+1) orthogonality conditions.  The GMM parameter estimates for the system may 
be obtained as follows.  First, consider equations (9) and (11).  As shown in the 
Appendix, the GMM parameter estimates are equivalent to those obtained using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) on equation (9) and using the sample mean for E(rj).  The remaining 
parameter estimates may be obtained by running an OLS regression of 
() ( ) ∑
=
+ − −
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j
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1
1 ’ ~ Z b  on  ct z , and setting UWM equal to the sample mean of 
() ( ) () ∑
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j
j jt bjtk jt r E r w w
1
1
~ ~ .  The Appendix shows that these point estimates are identical 
to the GMM estimates based on the full system. 
 
There are several advantages of setting this problem in a GMM context.  The 
multiplicative terms in equations (10) and (12) suggest that the error terms will be 
nonnormal, and the GMM justifies the estimators without normality, allowing general 
forms of conditional heteroskedasticity.  Another important advantage is the standard 
errors.  The standard errors account for conditional heteroskedasticity that may be an 
arbitrary function of  ct z .  The system also allows us to account for the covariance 
between the estimates of CWM and UWM.  This is important in computing a standard 
error for the difference between the two measures for the decomposition of performance 
in equation (4). 
 
While it is not feasible to literally estimate the full GMM system, as T > 
(N+1)(L+1), the linear and block-diagonal structure of the system allows us to derive 
asymptotic standard errors for the UWM and CWM that account for the estimation error    14   
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Examination of our conditional measures using artificial portfolios of only 5 assets and 1 
conditioning variable (which allows us to compare the full system GMM standard errors 
to the solutions given by (14)) are similar.   
 
III.  Data Description 
 
  The data for this study consists of three datasets.  The first contains the quarterly 
portfolio holdings and reported quarterly returns for a sample of U.S. equity pension fund 
managers.  The second consists of individual security returns, and the third contains the 
conditioning variables. 
 
 
 
    15   
A.  Pension Manager Data 
 
  We use the quarterly holdings and returns of 60 domestic equity portfolios during 
the time period from December 31, 1984 through December 31, 1994.  Each of these 
portfolios was actively managed by a professional money manager for one of the 
Investment Measurement Services (IMS) clients of Callan Associates, Inc.
13  The 
portfolios have between 20 and 40 quarters of data.  The starting date for each portfolio 
corresponds to either the time when the plan sponsor became an IMS client, the time 
when the manager was newly hired by the plan sponsor, or the first date for which the 
data were gathered.  There is no backfilling of data when managers are hired, which 
mitigates some selection biases.  The ending date corresponds to either the time when the 
plan sponsor ceased being an IMS client, the time when the manager was terminated by 
the plan sponsor, the time that the manager ceased operations, or the last quarter of 1994.  
Unlike most pension fund data bases, ours includes managers that were discontinued 
prior to the end of the sample period.  Thus, our sample provides some control of 
survivorship bias. 
 
  The capitalizations of the portfolios as of the end of either the last quarter 
available or September 30, 1994 ranged from $3.2 million to $1.5 billion with a median 
of $78.9 million.  The number of positions, or individual stocks held by a fund, as of the 
end of the sample ranged from 26 to 165 with a median of 62.  There are 22 growth 
managers and 29 value managers.  One of the portfolios is a balanced fund.  These 
designations are provided to Callan by the client and normally coincide with the 
manager’s self-declared “style.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
13 Quarterly holdings for some pension fund managers are available through SEC filings, though much of 
that is composite data, where the results of multiple portfolios are lumped together.  The data here provide 
an opportunity to examine the performance of individual US equity pension fund portfolios.    16   
B. Representativeness 
 
  Since our sample consists of portfolios being managed for clients of a single 
consulting firm, the question arises as to whether the sample is unusual relative to the 
larger universe of pension portfolios.  Data on pension fund returns have been used in 
several previous studies.  In all cases, the data are self-reported by the fund manager to a 
pension consulting firm.  These firms typically do not make the data available to the 
general public.  Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) use data from SEI.  Coggin, 
Fabozzi and Rahman (1993) and Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998a,b) use 
Frank Russell data.  Delguercio and Tkac (1998) and Coggin and Trzcinka (1999) use 
data from Mobius.  Ikenberry, Shockley, and Womack (1998) use data from DeMarche 
Associates.  No published study has compared the characteristics of the data from these 
various sources in any detail. 
 
We compare the quarterly reported return characteristics of our sample with data 
from the Frank Russell Company (FRC) from Myers (1999).
14  Panel A of Table I 
contains summary statistics from the Callan data;  panel B summarizes the FRC data.  
The reported returns are measured net of trading costs, but management fees have not 
been subtracted.  The statistics include means, standard deviations, minimum, median, 
and maximum values for the quarterly returns of equally-weighted portfolios.  The 
equally-weighted portfolios comprise all funds, surviving funds, and discontinued funds.  
Discontinued funds are defined as those that do not exist in the fourth quarter of 1994.  
We also include equally-weighted portfolios for the categories, grouping the funds by 
style (i.e. value and growth). 
 
Table I shows that the funds in the FRC sample have slightly higher average 
returns and standard errors than those in the Callan sample.  However, the ratio of the 
returns to the standard errors are similar.  Using all funds we have   49 . 0
02 . 8
92 . 3
= =
σ
r
 in 
                                                           
14 We are grateful to David Myers for preparing these summary statistics for us from his Frank Russell 
database.    17   
the FRC data;  50 . 0
40 . 7
69 . 3
= =
σ
r
 in the Callan data.  The lower returns and standard 
deviations may reflect higher cash holdings by the Callan funds.  We are told by Frank 
Russell company representatives that the firm encourages its funds to employ custodial, 
cash-sweeping services, and that cash holdings are typically small.  There are larger cash 
holdings in some of the Callan funds. 
 
Table I reveals that the average reported returns of growth funds exceeds value 
funds over this period (by 0.19% in Callan, 0.47% in FRC).  Interestingly, the average 
returns of discontinued funds exceeds surviving funds in both datasets: by 0.31% in 
Callan and 0.15% in FRC.  This is not an artifact of our particular sample period, as 
Myers (1999) finds a similar result for a sample of FRC funds with returns data from 
1979.  This contradicts the usual assumption about mutual fund survival, where the low-
return funds are less likely to survive.  In pension fund data bases, high-return funds may 
be discontinued when a "star" manager leaves to form a new firm.
15  
 
With 40 quarterly returns, the standard error of an average return in Table I is 
about  % 25 . 1 =
T
σ
.  Thus, none of the differences between these two datasets is 
statistically significant.  The similarities between the two samples indicates that the 
Callan sample is probably not atypical relative to the larger universe of pension 
portfolios.
16 
 
C.  The Timing of Benchmark Weights 
 
  We assume that the benchmark weight wbjtk in equations (5) and (6) is in the 
public information set at time t.  It is constructed using the actual portfolio weight at t-k.  
                                                           
15 See Christopherson, it al. (1998a) for a discussion of these differences and Myers (1999) for an empirical 
analysis of survival and persistence in pension fund performance. 
16 Our sample period, 1985-1994, may not fairly represent a longer historical record.  However, unlike 
returns-based measures, our weight-based measures should not be subject to biases due to long swings in    18   
Thus, the date when past weights become public information is an issue, and this may 
differ depending on the circumstances.   
 
Mutual funds’ portfolio weights become publicly available each quarter, although 
with a reporting lag in some cases.  In our application to pension funds, one may view the 
public information as that available to pension plan sponsors, if performance is being 
measured from their viewpoint.  If a plan sponsor wishes to know the current holdings of 
a portfolio at any given time, a manager is likely to respond within days, if not hours.  
However, plan sponsors systematically examine holdings data on a less frequent basis.  A 
lag of one quarter may be a reasonable assumption; however, one could argue for a longer 
period.  For example, it may be the case that a careful review of the holdings occurs on an 
annual basis with a more cursory review occurring at quarterly reporting periods.  The 
time when the weights become effectively contained in the relevant public information 
set is therefore not clear.  We try various lags k to evaluate the sensitivity of the measures 
to this assumption. 
 
D. Preliminary Analysis of the Portfolio Holdings 
 
In order to characterize differences in managers’ trading styles, we compute 
measures of momentum investing and turnover.  We refine a measure from Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers (GTW, 1995) to measure momentum 
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1
1 , and Nt is the number of positions held in the portfolio at time t.  
Unlike the weight-based performance measures, equation (15) captures the covariance 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the relative performance of different investment styles.  This is because the benchmark returns are not 
constructed from style indexes, but from the managers’ lagged weights.    19   
between a lagged return and a current weight change measured relative to a buy-and-hold 
strategy.  If the manager, on average, raises the weights on those securities that had high 
returns last quarter, the LM measure will be positive.  Thus, the measure captures whether 
a manager employs a momentum strategy in managing the portfolio.  
 
  Our implementation of the momentum measure differs from GTW in three ways.  
First, they pair quarterly weight changes with each of the 3 monthly returns in the 
previous quarter.  We simply use the lagged quarterly return.  We also measure the weight 
changes relative to a buy-and-hold strategy as opposed to the simple changes.  Thus, our 
measure avoids showing momentum for a buy-and-hold strategy.  Finally, GTW calculate 
their weights using the average of the beginning- and end-of-quarter share prices.  We use 
the actual weight data, based on share prices for the date on which the holdings are 
measured. 
 
  Table II presents the momentum measures for the sample of managed portfolios.  
Panel A summarizes the LM’s and their t-statistics by taking the means across the 
individual funds.
17 Panel A gives the impression that growth managers tend to be 
momentum investors while value managers tend to be contrarians.  Panel B shows that an 
equally-weighted portfolio of the growth managers also has a significantly positive LM, 
while the equally-weighted portfolio of value managers has a significantly negative LM. 
 
  Panel C of Table II presents the medians and the proportions of managers with 
positive or negative momentum measures.  Of 22 growth managers there are 19, or 86%, 
with positive LM’s, and 15 are significant at the 5% level.  Of 29 value managers there 
are 22, or 76%, with negative LM’s, and 15 are significant at the 5% level.  We also 
compute a binomial test on the proportions of managers with positive LMs.
18  T h e  
                                                           
17 The LM and a standard error for any given portfolio is computed using the GMM, where the 
orthogonality condition is   
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18 The binomial test is formed as follows:    20   
proportion of growth managers with positive LM’s is significantly greater than one half, 
and the proportion of value managers with positive LM’s is less than one half. 
 
Overall, Table II shows that growth managers tend to follow momentum 
strategies, while value managers tend to be contrarians.  GTW (1995) found a similar 
result for mutual funds.
19  Thus, the relation between the value and growth investment 
styles and momentum is not limited to the particular context of mutual funds.  The 
differences between growth and value funds will prove useful to us in evaluating the 
different performance measures. 
 
  Turnover is another area of difference between growth and value managers.  Our 
measure of turnover is  
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This measure examines the departure of a portfolio’s actual weights at time t,  it w , from 
the weights of a buy-and-hold strategy, starting from the actual weights at time t-1.  Of 
course, buying and selling within a quarter such that the end-of-quarter weights are 
unchanged will not be picked up by this measure. 
 
  Table III provides a comparison of the average quarterly turnover measures for 
growth and value managers.  It shows that turnover is higher, on average, for growth 
managers than for value managers.  Using a t-test for the difference in the means and a 
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 where P equals the proportion >0. 
If P>0.5, then it tests whether the proportion positive is significantly above 0.5.  If P<0.5, then it tests 
whether the proportion positive is significantly less than 0.5.  We use a one-sided test. 
19 A referee suggests a simple explanation.  Since growth (value) funds invest in stocks whose prices tend to 
be high (low) relative to earnings, cash flow, etc., they are likely to be found moving into stocks whose 
prices have recently risen (fallen).    21   
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank test, we can reject the null hypothesis that turnover is the 
same for both groups of managers at the 5% level.  Thus, the growth managers tend to 
depart more from a buy-and-hold strategy than the value managers.  On this basis, we 
may expect the interim trading bias of returns-based performance measures to differ for 
the two styles.  
 
E. Asset Returns 
 
  The second dataset contains returns for all the equity securities in the quarterly 
portfolio holdings data that could be associated with a security in the CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ daily file.  In addition, all identifiable cash holdings were 
summed and paired with the 3-month Treasury bill return from the CRSP Fama riskfree 
file, and all of the identifiable bond holdings (which consist of mostly Treasury notes and 
bonds) were summed and paired with the 60 to 120 month bond portfolio returns from the 
CRSP Fama files.  The fixed income holdings for the majority of these portfolios is 
usually small, although there are some portfolios and isolated periods for other portfolios 
where the fixed income component is substantial.  
 
  Using the quarterly holdings data and the CRSP returns, we construct a 
hypothetical quarterly return series for each portfolio.  The hypothetical quarterly returns 
assume a buy-and-hold strategy during the quarter.  The Appendix A contains a 
comparison between the reported quarterly returns in the Callan data and the hypothetical 
quarterly returns we constructed using the portfolio weights and the CRSP data. 
 
F. Instrumental Variables 
 
The publicly available information Zt are predetermined variables that appear to 
predict stock returns over time according to previous research.  These include a lagged 
dividend yield, default spread, term spread, T-bill yield, and a January indicator variable.     22   
We also include the lagged market return and the lagged return of individual stocks to 
capture the effects of serial correlation in returns.   
 
  The lagged dividend yield, DY(t), is the sum of the total dividends paid on the 
S&P 500 as reported in Citibase for the year preceding time t, divided by the value of that 
portfolio at time t.  The default spread, DS(t), is defined as the difference between 
Moody’s BAA rated corporate bond yield and the AAA rated corporate bond yield as 
reported in Citibase.  The term spread, TS(t), is the difference between the constant 
maturity 10-year Treasury bond yield and the 3-month Treasury Bill yield as reported in 
Citibase.  The 3-month Treasury Bill yield, TB(t), is also from Citibase.   
 
  These standard instruments, from the asset-pricing literature, are mostly market-
wide variables.  Thus, it is natural to think they would be more relevant to market timing 
or asset allocation than to active equity management.  However, Ferson and Harvey 
(1999) find that asset-specific loadings on a similar list of variables have strong 
explanatory power for the cross-section of portfolio returns.  Thus, by allowing stock-
specific coefficients in the expected return models, we capture information about the 
cross-section of returns.  The literature on momentum, following Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), suggests that own lagged returns also have explanatory power for the cross-
section of returns.  We conduct further experiments using firm-specific dividends and 
stock prices from CRSP to form additional instruments and find little difference in the 
results. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
 
  We first document the interim trading bias in returns-based measures and the 
performance using these measures for our sample of managers.  This provides a 
comparison for the weight-based measures.  The units of an alpha in a returns-based 
measure and the units of a weight-based measure are comparable: both are excess returns 
per quarter.     23   
 
A. Returns-based Measures 
 
  The returns-based measures include the average returns in excess of a benchmark, 
unconditional alphas, and conditional alphas.  We use the CRSP value-weighted index as 
the benchmark in Table IV.  In Table V we use style indexes for value or growth 
portfolios as the benchmarks.  The value (growth) index is the average of a small-cap and 
a large-cap, high (low) book-to-market portfolio constructed as in Fama and French 
(1993,1996).
20  For the conditional alphas, we use the methodology of Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) to incorporate the conditioning information.  This involves estimating  
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where  1
~
+ pt R  is the excess return on portfolio p; αp is the intercept term, the measure of 
alpha;  p b0  is the “average conditional beta”;  1
~
+ mt R  is the excess return on the market 
portfolio; bp is the vector of conditional beta response coefficients with respect to the 
public information set;  t z  is the vector of demeaned public information variables, and 
1
~
+ pt e  is the regression error. 
 
B.  Interim Trading Bias 
 
  Panel A of Table IV presents the results of applying the returns-based measures to 
the quarterly returns of hypothetical, interim trading portfolios.  The interim trading 
portfolios use only public information to trade each month within a quarter.  The 
portfolios start with an initial set of 500 stocks randomly selected from the CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ tape, with prices initially greater than or equal to $5 per share.  
The initial weights are in proportion to market capitalization.  The weights then evolve 
each month according to  
                                                           
20 Our data for the size and book-to-market portfolios are the same as used by Ferson and Harvey (1999).    24   
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− + ∑ = .  The E(rjt+1|Zt) is modeled by a regression on 
the lagged instruments.  Since the hypothetical portfolios do not consider the return 
volatility directly, they would not be optimal for risk averse investors.  However, in many 
models investors optimal weights are linear in the conditional mean return (eg. 
exponential utility with conditional normality), so our examples should provide a 
reasonable illustration of the potential biases.  The table shows the average results for 100 
interim trading portfolios.  Each portfolios starts with a different random selection of the 
500 stocks. 
  
  The results show that interim-trading bias has a significant impact on the returns-
based performance measures.  The average unconditional alpha of the strategies, relative 
to the value-weighted CRSP index, is 1.03% per quarter with an average t-ratio of 3.64.  
A conditional model seems to have little effect on the bias.  The average conditional 
alpha is 1.00% with an average t-ratio of 3.27.  Avoiding this severe interim trading bias 
provides a strong motivation for the conditional weight-based measures. 
 
C.  Returns-based Fund Performance  
 
  We summarize the returns-based measures for the funds in three ways.  First, we 
look at cross-sectional means of the average performance measures.  These weight each 
manager’s results equally, and therefore, put greater weight on dates at the end of the 
sample period where there are more managers.  Second, we examine equally-weighted 
portfolios of managers.  Because the managers have variable data histories, the weight a 
manager’s performance receives is directly related to the length of the data series, and 
each date receives equal weight.  Finally, we examine the median performance.  If the    25   
cross-section of returns is skewed, means and medians can imply different inferences 
about fund performance as emphasized by Ikenberry, Shockley and Womack (1998).   
Here we get similar inferences from the different statistics. 
 
  Panel B of Table IV and panel A of Table V display the averages of the returns-
based performance measures, taken across groups of individual funds.  The excess returns 
and alphas are percent per quarter.  All the measures are positive, with the exception of 
the excess return of value funds relative to the style index.  Panel C of Table IV and panel 
B of Table V present the results for equally-weighted portfolios.  The point estimates of 
performance are similar and are statistically significant in seven of the fifteen cases.   
Finding significant positive returns-based alphas for pension funds is consistent with 
Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993) and Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998b).  
With the exception of value portfolios using a style index, there is no significant 
difference between the conditional and unconditional returns-based alphas at the 
aggregate levels, which is consistent with Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998b). 
 
  Panel D of Table IV and panel C of Table V show the performance of the median 
managers.  The medians provide a qualitatively similar picture of performance as the 
preceding panels.  The median performance is positive for each group with one exception, 
and statistically significant in all but two cases.  The tables also report a binomial test, 
which find that the proportion of positive alphas is significantly greater than 50% in 13 of 
the 15 groups of portfolios.  Finally, joint tests across the funds based on the Bonferroni 
inequality find the extreme alphas to be significant in two cases.   
 
Given that the returns-based measures attribute abnormal performance to the 
interim trading portfolios, the evidence of abnormal performance for the funds is difficult 
to interpret.  The alphas of the interim trading portfolios are larger than the alphas that we 
measure for the actual funds.  However, the actual funds pay transaction costs while the 
interim trading portfolios do not.  (Pension funds pay additional management fees that are 
not reflected in these returns.)  The returns-based measures are also sensitive to the    26   
benchmark.  For example, using the S&P 500 and the equally-weighted fund portfolios, 
value funds outperform growth funds and produce a significant unconditional alpha (t-
ratio, 2.21).  Using the style benchmarks, growth funds outperform value funds by 0.5% 
per quarter.  Internalizing the benchmark, based on a fund’s lagged weights, is thus an 
attractive feature of the weight-based measures.
  
 
D. Weight-based Measures meet Artificial Strategies 
 
  The next three tables present performance measured with the CWM and UWM.  
Also included is the difference, UWM–CWM.  This is our estimate of 
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| , | , the public-information term in the decomposition of 
equation (4).  Table VI uses the weights lagged 1 quarter to construct the benchmark 
(k=1).  The expected return equation for each security uses the lagged security return as 
an element of Zt in (9), and the expected return is estimated using available data for 1984-
1994.  Table VII uses the weights lagged two quarters (k=2), along with the two lagged 
quarterly returns in the information set in (9).  Table VIII uses the weights lagged four 
quarters (k=4) with the four lagged quarterly returns.  The CWM in equation (10) 
includes a lagged market return, but no lagged individual security returns. 
 
  Panels A show the results for the interim-trading portfolios.  The measured 
performance is much lower than with the returns-based measures. However, the 
performance measures are statistically significant for the UWM at 0.25% per quarter.  
Using the conditioning information in the CWM lowers the point estimate to –0.03% and 
eliminates any significant performance.  This shows that the CWM can control the 
interim trading bias.  The differences UWM-CWM are positive and strongly significant, 
which confirms that  () ( ) () 0 | , | > ∆ Z r E Z w E Cov  for these strategies. 
 
The insignificant performance of the interim-trading strategy under the CWM is 
not due to a noisier measure.  The conditional weight-based measures actually appear    27   
more precise than the returns-based measures.  For example, a conditional alpha of about 
0.5% per quarter would get a t-ratio of two in Table IV, with returns-based measures.  
While none of the CWMs is significant in Table VI, it would take an abnormal return of 
less than 0.2% per quarter to achieve a t-ratio of two.  Since the conditional weight-based 
measures appear precise and well-specified in the face of interim trading, this increases 
our confidence in using them to measure actual fund performance. 
 
E. Weight-based Performance of Pension Funds 
 
  Panels B of Tables VI, VII and VIII display averages for the UWM and CWM in 
the manager sample.  The growth managers show small positive performance under all 
three versions of the UWM.  Their performance under the CWM is close to zero.  The 
alphas are typically much closer to zero than with the returns-based measures.  The 
weight-based measures thus produce smaller t-ratios, in spite of their smaller standard 
errors.  Given the greater precision and the ability of the conditional weight-based 
measures to control the interim trading bias, the inference of no abnormal performance 
using the CWM is more compelling than the returns-based measures of abnormal 
performance.  Thus, our evidence supports the hypothesis that the funds have no 
abnormal performance, once we control for public information and interim trading bias. 
 
  Panels C of the three tables present the results for equally-weighted portfolios of 
funds (all, growth, and value). The point estimates of performance are similar to those in 
Panel B.  The growth managers appear to fair slightly better under the UWM than the 
CWM.  The value managers, on the other hand, appear to fair better under the conditional 
measures.
21  
 
  The differences between the two measures, UWM-CWM, are the covariances 
between the portfolio weight changes and the conditional expected returns given the 
                                                           
21 We check the sensitivity of these results to the use of market-wide instruments by adding the individual 
stock dividend yield and the inverse of the price per share.  Such cross-sectional instruments can be    28   
public information, Z.  These differences are positive for growth funds and negative for 
value funds, but not significant.  This makes sense in view of the tendency of growth 
funds to follow momentum strategies, which imply a positive covariance with public 
information, while value funds tend to be contrarian.  These differences explain why the 
growth funds look worse under the CWM, where they get no credit for  () () Z r E w Cov | , ∆ .  
Similarly, value funds are not penalized for a negative covariance under the CWM, so 
their performance typically looks better. 
 
  Panels D of Tables VI, VII and VIII display the performance of the median 
managers for the entire sample and the subsamples of growth and value funds.  The 
median performance numbers mirror those of panels B and C.  Panels D also report a 
binomial test, which finds the proportion of growth managers with positive results to be 
significantly greater than 50%, when measuring performance with the UWM, but not 
significantly different from 50% when measuring performance with the CWM.  For value 
managers, the proportion with positive abnormal returns is not significantly different 
from 50% in either model.   
 
F. The Question of Power 
 
  The CWM is less susceptible to biases from interim trading on public information 
than the UWM or the returns-based measures.  However, by avoiding interim trading, 
weight-based measures may sacrifice power to detect superior ability.  A comparison of 
the standard errors in the previous tables indicates that the CWM has good precision, 
suggesting that the use of the additional portfolio weight information may mitigate the 
loss of power.  However, low power could be reflected in small point estimates of the 
performance, so the standard errors are not sufficient to evaluate power.  This section 
addresses the issue of power more directly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
motivated by the model in Bossaerts and Green (1989).  We find similar results with the addition of these 
instruments.    29   
  To examine the relative power, we create monthly interim trading portfolios with 
“superior” information.  These portfolios combine public information with information 
about the actual future returns.  We start with randomly selected stocks, like the interim-
trading portfolios used earlier.  The weights then evolve each month according to  
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We compound the monthly returns to quarterly returns for the returns-based measures, 
and sample the weights quarterly for the weight-based measures.   
 
The parameter  ρ  indicates the level of “superior” information embedded, and 
controls the correlation between the log weight changes and the actual future return.     
When  ρ = 1, the weight changes fully anticipate future returns and the correlation is 
perfect, while ρ = 0 is the previously analyzed interim trading portfolio, which has only 
public information.   In this case the correlation is the square root of the regression R-
squared for the return on the lagged instruments.   
 
  Table IX shows the average measured performance taken across 100 interim 
trading portfolios that use only public information (ρ = 0) as the first line in the panel.  
These differ by the initial, random selection of 500 stocks.  Below this is the relative 
performance for three different levels of  ρ .  The relative performance is the difference 
between the measured performance for the superior information portfolios and the 
corresponding portfolios with  ρ = 0.  Concentrating on the relative performance, we 
adjust for the biases in the various measures under the null hypothesis of no performance 
(ρ = 0) and interim trading.  Thus, the relative performance provides information about 
the “size-adjusted” power of the different measures. 
    30   
  Table IX shows that for every experiment, the CWM with k=1 has the highest 
power, among all the measures, to detect superior ability.  The t-ratio for the  CWM 
exceeds that of the returns-based measures and that of the UWM for every nonzero level 
of  ρ .  Thus, any concerns about loss of power in the face of informed interim trading, 
relative to returns-based measures, do not appear to represent a liability for the CWM 
with k=1.  For larger values of k, the power of the CWM does appear to suffer relative to 
the returns-based measures.  However, the average t-statistic remains larger than the 
UWM in all cases.  This suggests that future applications of the CWM should involve 
care in choosing the benchmark weights. 
 
G. Survivorship Issues 
 
  Table I compares discontinued and surviving funds.  Unlike  the evidence for 
mutual funds, discontinued pension funds have higher average returns.  Discontinued 
funds also have larger standard deviations in our sample, so it is interesting to compare 
the risk-adjusted performance of discontinued and surviving funds.   
 
  Panel A of Table X provides the comparison.  It shows that for all measures and 
styles (with one exception) the discontinued funds have higher risk-adjusted performance, 
consistent with the tendency of "star" performers to leave the sample.  However, the 
differences are seldom statistically significant and the economic magnitudes of the 
differences are small.  These differences are unlikely to affect our main conclusions about 
the relative reliability and precision of the various performance measures.  We still find 
that the typical performance is neutral under the CWM. 
 
While our sample includes discontinued funds, the potential for a selection bias 
still exists because we use only managers with at least 20 quarters of holdings history.  
There are several reasons why a manager may have fewer than 20 quarters of holdings 
history.  First, they may have been hired and then terminated within 20 quarters by a 
client.  One of several possible reasons for this would be poor performance.  Other    31   
possible reasons include a change in the strategy, personnel, or requirements of the plan 
sponsor; or a change in the personnel of the money manager.  Second, the pension client 
may have remained an IMS client, but decided to receive performance data on a returns-
only basis, which is a less costly service.  Third, the pension client may have discontinued 
being an IMS client.  This may have occurred for a variety of reasons, including the desire 
to hire a different consultant.  And finally, a pension fund may have become an IMS 
client or a manager may have been hired by a client recently enough so that 20 quarters of 
data had not been accumulated by the final quarter of 1994. 
 
  While we have no data on the funds that do not meet the 20 quarter selection 
criterion, panel B of Table X provides some information on the effects of sample 
selection criteria.  We split the sample into those funds with more than 30 quarters of data 
and those with 30 or fewer quarters.  We compare the means and standard deviations of 
return over a common time period, 1990-94.  The funds with the shorter data histories 
have somewhat higher returns (by 0.2% per quarter for all funds) and standard deviations 
(by 0.62% per quarter), indicating a mild selection bias.  The selection bias is unlikely to 
change our inferences about the relative performance of the measures. 
 
V.  Robustness 
 
  One of the main differences between the UWM and the CWM is the use of 
unconditional versus conditional expected returns.  This section explores the robustness 
of the results to the way the expected returns are measured.  We report the results of two 
experiments.  In the first, we replace the regression-based expected returns with expected 
returns from an asset-pricing model.  In the second we vary the instruments used in the 
regression-based expected returns. 
 
  Modelling expected returns by regression on the lagged instruments is likely to 
involve a substantial amount of noise.  Similarly, using a security’s past average return 
for the unconditional mean produces a noisy estimate.  While the standard errors account    32   
for noise, it is interesting to consider an alternative approach.  Here, we use a simple asset 
pricing model, the CAPM, to model the expected returns as  () t mt j Z R E | 1 + β , where  j β  is 
the simple regression beta for asset j and  () t m t mt j Z R E Z ’ | 1 = + β  is the regression-based 
estimate for the market index.
22  In the UWM we use  () m j R E β  in place of  ( ) j r E .  The 
results are in Panel A of Table XI, which may be compared with panels B and C of Table 
VI.
23  The results are similar to those obtained in Table VI, with growth manager 
performance under the CWM being closer to zero than with the UWM . 
 
  In our second experiment we further examine robustness to the choice of the 
lagged instruments.  We examine the distributions of the coefficients across the 
individual securities and find that several of the instruments produce “significant” 
coefficients relatively infrequently.  The two most important instruments appear to be the 
lagged Treasury bill and dividend yield.  Ferson and Schadt (1996) also find these to be 
the most important instruments for mutual fund returns.  We therefore run the models 
again using only these two instruments.  The results are in panel B of Table XI.  Again, 
we find results similar to panels B and C of Table VI, except growth manager 
performance looks worse under the CWM for the equally-weighted portfolio. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
  We combine a weight-based approach to measuring performance with 
conditioning information to create a conditional weight-based performance measure.  We 
examine this methodology and compare it with previous approaches.  In view of biases 
associated with dynamic trading and the use of public information, this comparison is 
important and we document that the new measures are superior to previous approaches.  
                                                           
22 Because the expected return in this model,  t m j Z β  is nonlinear in the parameters, our solution for the 
standard errors does not apply.  While the point estimates remain consistent, the standard errors in Panel A 
do not account for estimation of  m , and probably are understated. 
23 We assume constant betas, as in the classical latent variable model of Gibbons and Ferson (1985).  Ferson 
and Harvey (1991) argue that most of the time variation in conditional expected returns should come from 
the market premium, not from the betas.    33   
Finally, we illustrate the use of the new measures on a small sample of U.S. equity 
pension fund managers, during 1985-1994.   
 
  We find that the conditional weight-based measures can control an interim trading 
bias, caused by the ability to use publicly available information to trade between return 
measurement periods.  Using conditioning information in a returns-based measure does 
not control for this bias, which can be substantial.  Unconditional weight-based measures, 
as described by Grinblatt and Titman (1993), are also affected.  By using instruments for 
public information combined with portfolio weights, our new measures provide relatively 
precise and reliable estimates of performance. 
 
  In our sample of equity pension fund managers, traditional returns-based measures 
imply positive and significant abnormal performance.  However, the alphas are smaller 
than the potential effects of interim trading bias on the returns-based performance 
measures.  Growth-style funds, relative to value funds, tend to adopt a momentum trading 
strategy, which shows up as positive covariances between their weight changes and 
expected returns formed from public information.  Under unconditional weight-based 
measures, growth funds appear to outperform value funds.  However, using a conditional 
weight-based measure the performance difference is reversed, and abnormal performance 
is not significant.    34   
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Table I 
Statistics for Two Samples of Pension Fund Managers 
The table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum for the quarterly returns of 
equally weighted portfolios.  The returns are for all funds existing each quarter and for each category of 
surviving and discontinued funds by style.  Discontinued funds are defined as those that do not exist in the 
fourth quarter of 1994.  Panel A shows data from Callan Associates.  It consists of the 60 funds (45 survivors 
and 15 discontinued) in the Callan data that existed between January 1985 and December 1994 and that had at 
least 20 quarters of returns.  Styles in this case are declared by the managers.  Panel B shows data from the 
Frank Russell Company, from Myers (1999).  It consists of the 243 funds in the Frank Russell data that were 
either Growth or Value and that existed between January 1985 and December 1994.  Styles in this case are 
defined by the Frank Russell Company Company.  All is Growth plus Value and Total is Survivors plus 
Discontinued. 
         N u m b e r   o f  
   Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Median Max. Funds 
         
Panel A: Callan Associates Data       
         
  Total        
  All 3.69 7.40  -19.66 4.57  19.17  60 
 Growth 3.79 8.27  -19.64 4.40  21.88  22 
  Value 3.60 6.92  -20.14 4.36  17.32  29 
         
 Survivors       
  All 3.64 7.18  -18.77 4.49  18.34  45 
 Growth 3.67 7.87  -18.27 4.53  20.65  16 
  Value 3.57 6.85  -19.41 4.28  17.10  23 
         
 Discontinued       
  All 3.95 8.20  -22.03 5.22  21.11  15 
 Growth 4.14 9.36  -22.14 4.59  23.94  6 
  Value 4.03 7.50  -23.06 4.61  18.12  6 
         
Panel B: Frank Russell Company Data       
         
  Total       
  All 3.92 8.02  -21.23 4.58  20.80  243 
  Growth 4.17 9.21  -21.72 4.82  23.94  111 
  Value 3.70 7.20  -20.79 3.77  17.75  132 
         
  Survivors       
  All 4.00 8.16  -21.38 4.71  21.04  195 
  Growth 4.20 9.22  -21.92 4.84  23.78  96 
  Value 3.78 7.31  -20.80 3.77  17.82  99 
         
  Discontinued       
  All 4.15 7.79  -20.80 5.31  20.13  48 
  Growth 4.57 9.79  -20.88 5.49  24.63  15 
  Value 3.96 7.18  -20.75 4.74  17.60  33 
 
  
  
   
Table II 
Momentum Investing Measures for the Managed Portfolios 
The LM is the measure of momentum investing that pairs the portfolio weight deviations from a buy-and-hold 
strategy, with quarterly returns from the preceding quarter.  The t-statistics in panels A and B are White-
Hansen.  Panel A shows the cross-sectional means for LM and t-statistic for the entire sample, for those 
portfolios labeled as growth and value.  Panel B shows the LM for equally-weighted portfolios of all funds, 
growth funds, and value funds.  Panel C shows the median LM and the proportion of funds with positive LM’s 
along with a t-statistic and p-value from a binomial test of whether the median is positive (or negative), which is 
the same as testing whether the underlying proportion is higher (or lower) than 0.50.  Panel D shows the 
Bonferroni p-values for the entire sample and the two categories of growth and value.  Panel E shows a t-test 
for the difference in two means and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank test.  The null hypothesis is that there is 
no difference between the LMs for growth managers and those for value managers. 
          
     LM    t-stat  p-val 
          
 Panel  A  Mean       
    All  Funds 0.12   0.25   
    Growth  Funds 0.58   2.89   
    Value  Funds -0.21   -1.76   
          
 Panel  B Equally-weighted       
    All  Funds 0.09   1.90 0.06 
    Growth  Funds 0.57   6.09 0.00 
    Value  Funds -0.24   -6.19  0.00 
          
 Panel  C  Median      
    All  Funds  -0.03     
    Growth  Funds  0.59     
    Value  Funds  -0.31     
          
   Proportion>0      
    All  Funds 0.48    -0.26 0.80 
    Growth  Funds 0.86   3.41 0.00 
    Value  Funds 0.24    -2.79 0.01 
          
          
  Panel D  Bonferroni p-value Max.    Min.  
    All  Funds 0.000   0.000   
    Growth  Funds 0.000   0.000   
    Value  Funds 0.000   0.000   
          
  Panel E  Difference in L1M t-stat     
    EW Growth - EW Value  7.99       
          
   Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney z-stat     
    Value has less momentum  -4.66       
 
  
  
   
Table III 
Turnover Measures for the Managed Portfolios 
Quarterly turnover is derived from the portfolio weight changes, in comparison to a buy-and-hold strategy.  
Panel A shows the cross-sectional means for the quarterly turnover estimates for the entire sample, for those 
portfolios labeled as growth and as value.  Panel B shows the quarterly turnover for equally-weighted portfolios 
of growth funds and value funds.  Panel C shows the median quarterly turnover.  Panel D shows a t-test for the 
difference in two means and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank test.  The null hypothesis for each is that there is 
no difference between the quarterly turnover for growth managers and value managers. 
     Quarterly 
     Turnover 
      
 Panel  A  Mean   
   Growth  Funds  17% 
   Value  Funds  13% 
      
 Panel  B  Equally-weighted  
   Growth  Funds  14% 
   Value  Funds  10% 
      
 Panel  C  Median  
   Growth  Funds  16% 
   Value  Funds  12% 
      
  Panel D  Difference in Mean t-stat 
    Mean Growth - Mean Value  2.82 
      
   Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney z-stat 
    Value has lower turnover  -2.43 
 
  
  
   
Table IV 
Returns-based Measures of Pension Fund Performance using the CRSP value-
weighted index 
Excess return is the mean quarterly return in excess of the CRSP value-weighted index (percent per quarter).  
The unconditional alpha is Jensen’s measure with the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark portfolio.  
The conditional alpha is the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional Jensen measure.  The conditioning variables 
are the lagged dividend yield on the S&P 500, the lagged 3-month Treasury Bill yield, a January indicator 
variable, the lagged difference between the constant Maturity 10-year Treasury bond yield and the 3-month 
Treasury Bill yield, the lagged difference between Moody’s BAA rated corporate bond yield and the AAA 
rated corporate bond yield, and the lagged quarterly and annual return on the CRSP value-weighted index.  All 
are quarterly returns in percent.  Panel A shows the cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-
statistics for 100 interim trading portfolios.  Each portfolio starts with value weights on 500 randomly selected 
stocks from the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ universe whose price is greater than or equal to $5 prior to the 
beginning of the first quarter.  The portfolio then evolves using monthly rebalancing based on conditional 
expected returns using public information.  Panel B shows the cross-sectional means for the performance 
measures and t-statistics for the entire sample as well as for those portfolios labeled as growth and as value.  
Panel C shows the performance measures for equally-weighted portfolios of funds.  Panel D shows the median 
measures and the proportion of funds with positive performance measures along with a t-statistic and p-value 
from a binomial test of whether the proportion positive is higher (or lower) than 0.50.  Panel E shows the 
Bonferroni p-values for the entire sample and the two sub-groups of growth and value.   The data  cover the 
1985-1994 period (40 quarterly observations). 
    Excess      Unconditional    Conditional  
    Return   t-stat    Alpha   t-stat    Alpha   t-stat 
                    
Panel A  Interim-Trading                  
  Mean  1.00   3.60    1.03   3.64    1.00   3.27 
                    
Panel B  Mean                  
  All  Funds  0.19   0.35    0.29   0.73    0.21   0.58 
  Growth  Funds  0.33   0.58    0.25   0.57    0.02   0.10 
  Value  Funds  0.08   0.12    0.32   0.81    0.40   0.93 
                    
Panel C  Equally-weighted                  
  All  Funds  0.16   1.08    0.32   2.64    0.30   2.55 
  Growth  Funds  0.26   0.91    0.22   0.75    0.16   0.59 
  Value  Funds  0.06   0.27    0.37   2.21    0.43   2.33 
                    
Panel D  Median                  
  All Funds  0.17       0.32       0.34    
  Growth Funds  0.34       0.30       0.07    
  Value Funds  0.04       0.31       0.51    
                    
 Proportion of funds 
with positive 
performance 
                
  All  Funds  0.68   2.84    0.78   4.39    0.72   3.36 
  Growth  Funds  0.82   2.98    0.73   2.13    0.55   0.43 
  Value  Funds  0.59   0.93    0.83   3.53    0.90   4.27 
                    
                    
Panel E  Bonferroni p-value Max.   Min.    Max.   Min.   Max.   Min. 
 All  Funds  1.00    1.00    0.14    1.00    0.06    1.00 
 Growth  Funds  1.00    1.00    0.05    1.00    0.25    0.67 
 Value  Funds  1.00    1.00    0.11    1.00    0.45    1.00  
  
   
Table V 
Returns-based Measures of Pension Fund Performance using style index benchmarks 
Excess return is the mean quarterly return in excess of a style index.  The unconditional alpha is Jensen’s 
measure with a style index as the benchmark portfolio.  The conditional alpha is the Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
conditional Jensen measure.  The conditioning variables are the lagged dividend yield on the S&P 500, the 
lagged 3-month Treasury Bill yield, a January indicator variable, the lagged difference between the constant 
Maturity 10-year Treasury bond yield and the 3-month Treasury Bill yield, the lagged difference between 
Moody’s BAA rated corporate bond yield and the AAA rated corporate bond yield, and the lagged quarterly 
and annual return on a style index.  All are quarterly returns in percent.  Panel A shows the cross-sectional 
means for the performance measures and t-statistics for the growth and value funds.  Panel B shows the 
performance measures for equally-weighted portfolios of funds.  Panel C shows the median measures and the 
proportion of funds with positive performance measures along with a t-statistic and p-value from a binomial test 
of whether the proportion positive is higher (or lower) than 0.50.  Panel D shows the Bonferroni p-values for 
the two sub-groups of growth and value.   
    Excess      Unconditional    Conditional  
    Return   t-stat    Alpha   t-stat    Alpha   t-stat 
                    
Panel A  Mean                  
  Growth  Funds  0.52   0.84    0.94   1.88    1.00   1.95 
  Value  Funds  -0.21   -0.30    0.49   0.70    1.31   2.01 
                    
Panel B  Equally-weighted                  
  Growth Funds  0.52    1.06    0.95    2.78    1.11    3.29 
  Value Funds  -0.21    -0.37    0.45    1.00    1.03    2.59 
                    
Panel C  Median                  
  Growth Funds  0.55       0.98       1.14    
  Value Funds  -0.23       0.48       1.19    
                    
 Proportion of funds 
with positive 
performance 
                
  Growth  Funds  0.86   3.41    1.00   4.69    1.00   4.69 
  Value  Funds  0.17   -3.53    0.90   4.27    1.00   5.39 
                    
                    
Panel D  Bonferroni p-value Max.   Min.    Max.   Min.   Max.   Min. 
 Growth  Funds  1.00    1.00    0.05    1.00    0.25    0.67 
 Value  Funds  1.00    1.00    0.11    1.00    0.45    1.00 
 
  
  
   
 Table VI 
Weight-based Measures of Pension Portfolio Performance Using k=1 Lag 
The UWM is the unconditional weight measure.  The CWM is the conditional weight measure.  Difference is 
the UWM - CWM.  All are quarterly and in percent.  The 1 Lag indicates the information lag used to create the 
benchmark weight is one quarter.  The t-statistics in panels A though C are White-Hansen.  Panel A shows the 
cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-statistics for 100 interim trading portfolios.  Each of 
these portfolios starts with value weights on 500 randomly selected stocks from the CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ universe whose initial price is greater than or equal to $5 per share.  The portfolio 
then evolves using monthly rebalancing based on conditional expected returns using public information.  Panel 
B shows the cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-statistics for the entire sample of actual 
funds, as well as for growth and value funds.  Panel C shows the performance measures for equally-weighted 
portfolios of funds.  Panel D shows the median measure and the proportion of funds with positive performance 
measures along with a t-statistic and p-value from a binomial test of whether the median is positive (or 
negative), which is the same as testing whether the underlying proportion is higher (or lower) than 0.50.   
 
                                
     UWM   t-stat    CWM    t-stat    Difference   t-stat 
            
Panel A  Interim-Trading          
 Mean 0.25  5.13  -0.03  -0.47    0.28 7.34 
            
Panel B  Mean                 
  All Funds 0.08  0.38   0.04   0.30   0.04  0.14 
  Growth Funds 0.09  0.45   0.01   -0.04   0.08  0.57 
  Value Funds 0.05  0.26   0.05   0.46   0.00  -0.21 
                   
Panel C  Equally-weighted                
  All Funds 0.06  1.14   0.04   0.78   0.02  0.54 
  Growth Funds 0.05  0.45   -0.03   -0.18   0.07  0.68 
  Value Funds 0.04  0.76   0.06   0.88   -0.03  -0.45 
                     
Panel D  Median              
  All  Funds 0.07   0.03       0.04  
  Growth  Funds 0.06   0.01       0.07  
  Value  Funds 0.06   0.04       -0.01  
 
Proportion of funds 
with positive
perfornmance          
  All Funds 0.72  3.36   0.60   1.55   0.67  2.58 
  Growth Funds 0.82  2.98   0.55   0.43   0.91  3.84 
  Value Funds 0.62  1.30   0.62   1.30   0.45  -0.56 
                                    
  
  
   
Table VII 
Weight-based Measures of Pension Portfolio Performance Using k=2 Lags 
The UWM is the unconditional weight measure.  The CWM is the conditional weight measure.  Difference is 
the UWM - CWM.  All are quarterly and in percent.  The 2 Lags indicates the information lag used to create 
the benchmark weight is two quarters.  The t-statistics in panels A though C are White-Hansen.  Panel A shows 
the cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-statistics for 100 interim trading portfolios.  Each 
of these portfolios starts with value weights on 500 randomly selected stocks from the CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ universe whose initial price is greater than or equal to $5 per share.  The portfolio 
then evolves using monthly rebalancing based on conditional expected returns using public information.  Panel 
B shows the cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-statistics for the entire sample of actual 
funds, as well as for growth and value funds.  Panel C shows the performance measures for equally-weighted 
portfolios of funds.  Panel D shows the median measure and the proportion of funds with positive performance 
measures along with a t-statistic and p-value from a binomial test of whether the median is positive (or 
negative), which is the same as testing whether the underlying proportion is higher (or lower) than 0.50.  
 
                                
     UWM   t-stat    CWM    t-stat    Difference   t-stat 
            
Panel A  Interim-Trading          
 Mean 0.40  4.65  0.02  0.17    0.38 7.03 
            
Panel B  Mean                 
  All Funds 0.11  0.42   0.05   0.31   0.06  0.15 
  Growth Funds 0.14  0.49   0.07   0.14   0.07  0.41 
  Value Funds 0.05  0.23   0.04   0.43   0.01  -0.18 
                   
Panel C  Equally-weighted                
  All Funds 0.11  1.05   0.06   0.64   0.05  0.66 
  Growth Funds 0.12  0.67   0.03   0.12   0.09  0.46 
  Value Funds 0.02  0.25   0.04   0.37   -0.02  -0.26 
                     
Panel D  Median              
  All  Funds 0.08   0.05       0.04  
  Growth  Funds 0.13   0.07       0.07  
  Value  Funds 0.06   0.05       -0.03  
 
Proportion of funds 
with positive
perfornmance          
  All Funds 0.73  3.61   0.65   2.32   0.62  1.81 
  Growth Funds 0.82  2.98   0.68   1.71   0.73  2.13 
  Value Funds 0.62  1.30   0.62   1.30   0.45  -0.56 
                                    
  
  
   
Table VIII 
Weight-based Measures of Pension Portfolio Performance Using k=4 Lags 
The UWM is the unconditional weight measure.  The CWM is the conditional weight measure.  Difference is 
the UWM - CWM.  All are quarterly and in percent.  The 4 Lags indicates the information lag used to create 
the benchmark weight is four quarters.  The t-statistics in panels A though C are White-Hansen.  Panel A shows 
the cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-statistics for 100 interim trading portfolios.  Each 
of these portfolios starts with value weights on 500 randomly selected stocks from the CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ universe whose initial price is greater than or equal to $5 per share.  The portfolio 
then evolves using monthly rebalancing based on conditional expected returns using public information.  Panel 
B shows the cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-statistics for the entire sample of actual 
funds, as well as for growth and value funds.  Panel C shows the performance measures for equally-weighted 
portfolios of funds.  Panel D shows the median measure and the proportion of funds with positive performance 
measures along with a t-statistic and p-value from a binomial test of whether the median is positive (or 
negative), which is the same as testing whether the underlying proportion is higher (or lower) than 0.50.   
 
                                
     UWM   t-stat    CWM    t-stat    Difference   t-stat 
            
Panel A  Interim-Trading           
 Mean 0.44  2.94  0.04  0.36    0.40 3.59 
            
Panel B  Mean                 
  All Funds 0.17  0.35   0.03   0.12   0.14  0.25 
  Growth Funds 0.18  0.45   0.02   0.14   0.16  0.43 
  Value Funds 0.09  0.15   0.01   0.09   0.08  0.02 
                   
Panel C  Equally-weighted                 
  All Funds 0.12  0.63   0.03    0.13   0.09  0.53 
  Growth Funds 0.24  0.72   0.03    0.06   0.21  0.65 
  Value Funds 0.01  -0.06   -0.02    -0.09   0.01  0.04 
                     
Panel D  Median              
  All Funds 0.11    0.00        0.09   
  Growth Funds 0.13    -0.06        0.13   
  Value Funds 0.10    0.00        0.02   
 
Proportion of funds 
with positive
performance           
  All Funds 0.72  3.36   0.48    -0.26   0.67  2.58 
  Growth Funds 0.77  2.56   0.41    -0.85   0.77  2.56 
  Value Funds 0.62  1.30   0.48    -0.19   0.55  0.56 
                                    
  
  
   
Table IX 
Performance Measures using Superior-Information Portfolios 
Excess return is the mean quarterly return in excess of the CRSP value-weighted index.  The unconditional 
alpha is Jensen’s measure with the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark portfolio.  The conditional 
alpha is the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional Jensen measure.  The UWM is the unconditional weight 
measure.  The CWM is the conditional weight measure.  ρ is the level of superior information.  The table shows 
the cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-statistics for 100 interim trading portfolios.  Each 
portfolio starts with value weights on 500 randomly selected stocks from the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
universe whose price is greater than or equal to $5 prior to the beginning of the first quarter.  The portfolio then 
evolves using monthly rebalancing based on the following equation: 
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The data cover the 1985-1994 period (40 observations).  Relative performance is the difference between the 
performance of the portfolio in question and the corresponding ρ = 0 portfolio. 
 
   Mean  Mean Mean  K=1  K=2  K=4 
 Excess  Unconditional  Conditional  Mean           Mean            Mean          
   Return  Alpha Alpha  UWM CWM UWM  CWM UWM CWM
              
ρ = 0 1.00 1.03 1.00  0.25 -0.03 0.40  0.02 0.44 0.04
            
ρ = 0.10     
relative performance 0.06  0.07 0.06  0.03 0.04 0.02  0.04 0.01 0.03
t-statistic (6.96) (6.79) (6.39)  (6.03) (8.03) (1.66)  (4.54) (0.58) (2.33)
              
ρ = 0.20     
relative performance 0.12  0.12 0.12  0.07 0.08 0.04  0.07 0.01 0.06
t-statistic (6.38) (6.39) (6.27)  (6.02) (8.00) (1.55)  (4.45) (0.52) (2.24)
        
ρ = 0.50     
relative performance 0.25  0.27 0.29  0.15 0.19 0.07  0.15 0.01 0.14
t-statistic (4.90) (5.09) (5.23)  (6.04) (7.90) (1.33)  (4.36) (0.39) (2.05)
 
  
  
   
Table X 
Effects of Survival Criteria 
Panel A shows across fund means of various measures of performance.  Discontinued funds are those that left 
the database before December of 1994.  The unconditional alpha is Jensen’s measure with the CRSP value-
weighted index as the benchmark portfolio.  The conditional alpha is the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional 
Jensen measure.  The conditioning variables are the lagged dividend yield on the S&P 500, the lagged 3-month 
Treasury Bill yield, a January indicator variable, the lagged difference between the constant Maturity 10-year 
Treasury bond yield and the 3-month Treasury Bill yield, the lagged difference between Moody’s BAA rated 
corporate bond yield and the AAA rated corporate bond yield, and the lagged quarterly return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index.  The UWM is unconditional weight measure and the CWM is the conditional weight 
measure.  The measures are quarterly and in percent.  Panel B shows the mean and standard deviation of the 
quarterly returns of equally weighted portfolios from 1990-1994.  The returns are for all funds existing in each 
quarter for each category.  Funds with 31 to 40 quarters are all funds with at least 31 quarters over the full 
sample.  Funds with 20 to 30 quarters are all funds with between 20 and 30 quarters over the full sample.  
 
      Uncond.  Cond.              k=1               k=2               k=4 
Panel  A      Alpha Alpha UWM CWM UWM CWM UWM CWM 
             
 Mean           
  All  Funds    0.29 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.03 
  15  Discontinued  Funds    0.33 0.37 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.05 0.28 0.04 
             
  All  Growth    0.25 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.02 
  6  Discontinued  Growth    0.36 0.33 0.09 0.03 0.15  -0.01 0.28 0.04 
             
  All  Value    0.32 0.40 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.01 
  6  Discontinued  Value    0.45 0.57 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.09 0.37 0.08 
 
        All Funds     Growth Funds    Value Funds   
Panel B    Mean    St. Dev.    Mean    St. Dev.    Mean    St. Dev.   
                    
Funds with 31 to 40 quarters of data  2.42    5.92    2.58    6.73    2.26    5.57   
                    
Funds with 20 to 30 quarters of data  2.62    6.54    2.64    7.61    2.45    5.95   
  
  
   
Table XI 
Weight-based Measures Using Alternative Measures of Expected Returns 
The UWM is the unconditional weight measure.  The CWM is the conditional weight measure.  Difference is 
the UWM - CWM.  All are quarterly and in percent.  The information lag is k=1.  The t-statistics are White-
Hansen.  Panel A uses the CAPM to calculate expected returns.  It shows the cross-sectional means for the 
performance measures and t-statistics for the entire sample of actual funds, as well as for growth and value 
funds, and the performance measures for equally-weighted portfolios of funds.  Panel B uses a subset of the 
conditioning variables (dividend yield and 3-month T-bill yield to estimate expected returns.  It shows the 
cross-sectional means for the performance measures and t-statistics for the entire sample of actual funds, as well 
as for growth and value funds, and the performance measures for equally-weighted portfolios of funds.   
 
                                
     UWM   t-stat    CWM    t-stat    Difference   t-stat 
            
Panel A  Mean                 
  All Funds 0.08  0.44   0.07   0.42   0.02  0.13 
  Growth Funds 0.12  0.67   0.09   0.54   0.03  0.34 
  Value Funds 0.04  0.20   0.04   0.24   0.00  -0.09 
                   
 Equally-weighted                
  All Funds 0.05  1.46   0.02   0.90   0.03  1.39 
  Growth Funds 0.06  0.73   0.01   0.19   0.04  1.10 
  Value Funds 0.02  0.46   0.01   0.45   0.00  0.20 
                     
Panel B  Mean                 
  All Funds 0.08  0.33   0.03   0.13   0.05  0.23 
  Growth Funds 0.09  0.40   -0.04   -0.13   0.12  0.90 
  Value Funds 0.05  0.21   0.06   0.29   -0.02  -0.29 
                   
 Equally-weighted                
  All Funds 0.06  1.14   0.04   0.78   0.02  0.54 
  Growth Funds 0.05  0.45   -0.07   -0.50   0.12  1.41 
  Value Funds 0.04  0.76   0.07   0.72   -0.03  -0.50 
                                    
  
     
Appendix 
 
A.  Hypothetical versus Reported Returns 
 
The reported quarterly returns for the funds, which we use in our analyses of the 
returns-based measures, are computed by Callan’s IMS group based on daily holdings and 
transactions data, net of estimated trading costs.  The reported returns are gross of 
management fees, however, because different clients may be charged different fees [see 
Halpern and Fowler (1991)].  The first column of Table IA shows the correlation between 
the reported and hypothetical returns.  The second column (”Tracking error”) contains the 
standard deviation of the difference between the two return series.  The third column 
labeled  “Coverage” shows the percentage of the total market value of a portfolio, 
represented by all the securities that were identified as a stock in the CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ file, a bond, or a cash instrument.  The fourth column contains 
the difference between the means of the reported returns and the hypothetical returns.  
The fifth column contains the difference between the standard deviations.  The sixth 
column contains the difference between the unconditional alphas.  The alphas are 
calculated as the intercept, regressing the returns in excess of the return to rolling over a 
one-month Treasury bill, on the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted index. 
 
  The deviations between the reported returns and the hypothetical returns reflect 
four potential differences.  The first is caused by the fact that stock purchases and sales 
within quarters are not included in the hypothetical return calculation.  The hypothetical 
returns assume that stocks held at the beginning of a quarter stay in the portfolio for the 
entire quarter with dividends reinvested.  The second is that the reported returns are net of 
estimated transaction costs, while the hypothetical returns reflect no transaction costs.  
The third is that securities not identified are not included in the hypothetical return 
calculation.  And finally, the reported returns reflect fixed income returns on an 
individual security basis, while the hypothetical returns assume fixed income returns are 
equal to either the three-month Treasury bill return or the return on the 60 to 120 month 
bond portfolio from the CRSP Fama files. 
 
  Table IA shows that the reported and hypothetical returns are similar for most of 
the portfolios.  However, we cannot infer that interim trading effects are small from this 
result because of the other sources of differences between the reported and hypothetical 
returns.  The standard deviations of the difference between the reported and hypothetical  
     
returns range from 0.48% to 3.22% per quarter.  For 42 of the 60 funds, the standard 
deviation is below 1%.  This compares with a standard deviation of 0.57% for the 
difference between the S&P 500 and the CRSP VW Index.   
 
The average mean return and unconditional alpha of the reported portfolio returns 
are slightly higher than for the hypothetical portfolios, despite the fact that the reported 
returns are net of transaction costs while the hypothetical returns pay no transaction costs.   
This may indicate that there are total return gains from intra-quarter trading that exceed 
the transaction costs borne by institutional investors.  It is not possible to evaluate 
whether these differences reflect differences in risk due to intraquarter trading, without 
higher frequency data.  The average difference between the reported and hypothetical 
returns is only 0.07% per quarter, although it ranges between -0.73 and 0.68% across the 
60 funds.  The differences in alpha average 0.08% and have a smaller range.  These 
differences are small relative to the interim trading and momentum effects in the returns-
based measures. 
 
B. Standard  Errors 
 
Following the notation in the text, we write the GMM system (9)-(12) to isolate the first 
and second stage parameters as 
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where  2 h  is linear in B but does not depend on  .  Because the system (A.1) is exactly 
identified, the GMM parameter estimates are obtained by setting  0 1 = g ,  0 2 = g  in 
(A.2).  The solution gives B ˆ  as the first stage OLS estimator and   as the second stage 
estimator described in the text.  The estimate of   may be expressed  
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.  We use the delta method to obtain the 
asymptotic variance of  ˆ , where 
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The asymptotic covariances satisfy: 
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Equation (A.3) implies  () ( ) ’ B B ˆ ˆ , ˆ Cov Cov − = .  Substituting this expression into (A.5) 
and simplifying gives the asymptotic variance of  ˆ .  Thus,  () − ˆ T  converges to a 
normal with mean zero and variance: 
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Table IA 
Comparison of Reported Quarterly Returns vs. Hypothetical Quarterly Returns 
Portfolio number identifies a given portfolio managed by a money manager.  Reported quarterly returns are 
returns in percent based on daily holdings and transactions data as given by Callan Associates.  Hypothetical 
quarterly returns are the returns calculated from the quarterly holdings assuming the weights are constant 
throughout the quarter.  Correlation is the correlation between the reported returns and the hypothetical returns.  
Tracking error is the standard deviation of the difference between the reported returns and the hypothetical 
returns in percent.  Percent coverage is the sum of the market values for all securities identified either as cash, 
as fixed income, or as a stock in the CRSP NYSE/AMAX/NASDAQ files for all time periods over the sum of 
the market values for all securities ever held multiplied by 100.  Difference in mean is the difference in the 
mean of the reported quarterly return and the hypothetical returns.  Difference in st. dev. is the difference in the 
standard deviation of the reported quarterly returns and the hypothetical returns.  Difference in alpha is the 
difference in quarterly alphas in percent using reported returns and the hypothetical returns.  Difference in beta 
is the difference in beta using the reported quarterly returns and the hypothetical returns.  The alphas and betas 
are calculated using the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark.  The mean at the bottom is taken across 
the 60 rows. 
Portfolio    Tracking   Difference Difference Difference Difference 
 Number  Correlation  Error  Coverage  in Means  in St. Dev.  in Alpha  in Beta 
1  0.98 1.02  97 0.09  -0.22 0.25  -0.07 
2  0.99 0.95  96 0.06  -0.13 0.08  -0.01 
3  1.00 0.69  99  -0.01 0.03  -0.04 0.01 
4  1.00 0.90  95 0.54 0.15 0.49 0.02 
5  0.99 0.87  85 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.01 
6  1.00 0.57  96  -0.07 0.08  -0.09 0.01 
7  0.99 0.75  97 0.16  -0.01 0.16 0.00 
8  0.99 1.18  100 0.32 0.40 0.22 0.05 
9  1.00 0.73  99 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.03 
10  1.00 0.63  99 0.23  -0.03 0.23 0.00 
11  0.99 0.74  99 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.01 
12  0.94  2.47  92 -0.23 -0.79  0.08 -0.14 
13  0.99  1.40  92 -0.03 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 
14  0.98  1.51  89 -0.27 -1.10  0.06 -0.15 
15  0.99 0.71  98 0.01  -0.08 0.03  -0.01 
16  1.00  0.76  96 -0.24 -0.22 -0.18 -0.03 
17  1.00 0.72  100  -0.17 0.12  -0.20 0.01 
18  1.00 0.66  98  -0.13 0.18  -0.17 0.02 
19  1.00 0.70  98 0.31 0.01 0.32 0.00 
20  1.00 0.46  100 0.06  -0.03 0.06 0.00 
21  0.99 1.22  98 0.68 0.32 0.58 0.05 
22  1.00 0.70  98 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.02 
23  0.97 2.32  96  -0.03 0.60  -0.17 0.07 
24  0.99  1.46  96 -0.07 -0.52  0.04 -0.05 
25  0.99 1.15  100 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.01 
26  0.99 0.73  99 0.23  -0.03 0.22 0.01 
27  0.99 1.48  99 0.07 0.49 0.00 0.05 
28  1.00 0.63  99 0.12  -0.08 0.15  -0.01 
29  0.97 0.54  96 0.15  -0.10 0.18  -0.01 
30  1.00 0.93  93 0.17  -0.26 0.21  -0.02 
31  0.99 0.75  96  -0.10 0.16  -0.15 0.03 
32  0.99 0.92  100  -0.16 0.22  -0.20 0.02 
33  0.99 0.99  98 0.18  -0.09 0.19 0.00 
34  1.00 0.68  72  -0.13 0.21  -0.20 0.04 
35  0.99  1.22  87 -0.01 -0.84  0.16 -0.10 
36  0.99  0.80  93 -0.11 -0.35 -0.01 -0.03 
37  1.00 0.74  99 0.47 0.16 0.42 0.02  
  
   
38  1.00 0.79  96 0.31 0.18 0.25 0.03 
39  1.00 0.69  99 0.04  -0.13 0.08  -0.02 
40  1.00  0.62  98 -0.06 -0.17 -0.03 -0.03 
41  0.99 1.05  98  -0.06 0.05  -0.06 0.00 
42  1.00 0.59  99 0.00  -0.05 0.05  -0.03 
43  1.00 0.54  100 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.01 
44  0.98 1.80  78  -0.22 0.64  -0.43 0.12 
45  0.99 0.58  99 0.08  -0.12 0.10  -0.01 
46  0.99  0.73  95 -0.10 -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 
47  0.99  0.87  94 -0.04 -0.17  0.01 -0.03 
48  0.99 0.85  99 0.23  -0.06 0.25  -0.01 
49  1.00 0.48  100 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.02 
50  0.98  1.15  97 -0.30 -0.13 -0.29  0.00 
51  1.00 0.64  100 0.28  -0.19 0.33  -0.03 
52  0.99 1.05  96 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.04 
53  0.96  2.06  87 -0.73 -0.28 -0.58 -0.09 
54  0.99 0.89  99  -0.04 0.02  -0.04 0.00 
55  0.99 0.65  100  -0.26 0.30  -0.30 0.04 
56  0.99 0.63  96 0.23  -0.11 0.26  -0.02 
57  0.99 0.57  100 0.07  -0.05 0.08  -0.01 
58  0.97 3.22  99 0.83 2.06 0.59 0.20 
59  0.99 0.91  91 0.45  -0.24 0.51  -0.03 
60  0.99 1.05  98 0.14  -0.11 0.26  -0.05 
         
Mean  0.99 0.97  96 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.00 
 
 